The FTX Collapse and Crypto Contagion
FTX, once the world's second-largest crypto exchange, collapsed in November 2022 after reporting revealed its sister trading firm Alameda Research had been quietly using customer deposits as its own trading capital — and the exchange folded in about a week once customers tried to withdraw.
Prerequisites: The Terra-Luna Collapse
FTX was a crypto exchange where customers deposited dollars and crypto to trade, and Alameda Research was a separate trading firm, also founded by Sam Bankman-Fried, that traded on FTX and other venues. On paper the two were distinct businesses. In practice, according to evidence at Bankman-Fried's 2023 fraud trial, FTX had quietly given Alameda a effectively unlimited line of credit funded by customer deposits sitting on the exchange — meaning money customers thought was held for their own trading was, in large part, being lent out to Alameda to cover its own trading losses and investments.
The trigger
In November 2022, the crypto news outlet CoinDesk published a leaked balance sheet showing that a huge share of Alameda's assets consisted of FTT, a token issued by FTX itself, rather than cash or other independent assets — meaning Alameda's apparent net worth was largely backed by a token whose value FTX itself controlled. Binance, a rival exchange and early FTX investor, announced it would sell its own FTT holdings, and the resulting price drop in FTT raised the alarm that Alameda's balance sheet was far weaker than assumed. Customers rushed to withdraw funds from FTX; the exchange could not meet the withdrawals because, as it turned out, a large share of "customer" money had already been spent, lent out, or invested elsewhere by Alameda. FTX filed for bankruptcy within about a week of the CoinDesk report — a collapse that, at its size, moved faster than nearly any prior financial failure.
The contagion
Because FTX and Alameda were large counterparties and lenders across the crypto industry, several other firms that held assets on FTX, had loans outstanding to Alameda, or depended on FTX for liquidity failed or were badly damaged in the following months — a chain reaction that compounded losses already spreading through the industry after The Terra-Luna Collapse earlier that year.
FTX's failure was not primarily a market-price event — crypto prices were already down for the year — it was a fraud and governance failure: customer deposits, which should have been segregated and available on demand, had been commingled with and lent to a related trading firm, leaving the exchange unable to honor withdrawals once confidence broke.
The mistake is assuming a large, well-known exchange must be safeguarding customer assets the way a regulated bank or broker-dealer would. Crypto exchanges in 2022 were largely unregulated with respect to custody rules, and FTX's structure — a exchange and an affiliated trading firm sharing capital behind the scenes — is exactly the kind of self-dealing those custody rules exist to prevent in traditional finance.
Related concepts
Practice in interviews
Further reading
- US Department of Justice, United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried, Trial Record (2023)