The 2008 Short-Sale Ban and Its Dislocations
For three weeks in September 2008 the SEC banned short selling in roughly 800 financial stocks to stop what it saw as predatory bear raids, but the ban also broke option market makers' ability to hedge, widened spreads, and by most later studies made prices noisier, not calmer.
Prerequisites: How Short Selling Works
As Lehman Brothers collapsed and other financial firms wobbled in September 2008, regulators worried that short sellers were accelerating the panic — piling on to already-falling bank stocks and pushing them toward failure. On September 19, 2008, the SEC issued an emergency order banning short selling in roughly 800 financial company stocks. The stated goal was to stop what officials described as manipulative bear raids and restore confidence.
The ban lasted about three weeks. What it actually did to markets turned out to be more complicated, and mostly negative, once researchers had the data to check.
A short-sale ban removes one side of a two-sided market from the specific instrument that policymakers can see (the stock), but sophisticated players simply route the same directional bet through other instruments — while ordinary market-making activity that relies on short selling to hedge gets shut down along with it.
Why banning shorts didn't calm anything
Short selling isn't only used by investors betting a stock will fall. Options market makers routinely short the underlying stock to hedge the delta of options they've sold to customers — that's not a directional bet, it's risk management that lets them keep quoting tight two-sided markets in the options themselves. When the ban made stock shorting illegal in the affected names, those market makers could no longer hedge cleanly. Many responded by widening bid-ask spreads on options dramatically, or pulling back from making markets in the banned names altogether, because they could no longer lay off their risk.
Worked example
Before the ban, a market maker quoting a put option on a large bank might show a $0.10-wide market, comfortable that if a customer sold puts to them, they could short the stock to hedge the resulting delta exposure instantly. During the ban, that hedge was gone for the named financial stocks. The market maker's honest choice was to either quote a much wider spread — say $0.60 — to compensate for the unhedged risk they'd be carrying, or stop quoting the name altogether. Multiply that across hundreds of banned names and thousands of options series, and academic studies later found that price efficiency measures (how quickly and accurately prices reflected new information) got measurably worse during the ban window, not better, even as the ban's political goal was to "stabilize" prices.
What this means in practice
The 2008 ban is now the reference case cited whenever a regulator proposes banning short selling during a crisis (a recurring idea — several European regulators tried similar bans in 2008–2011 and again in 2020). The consistent finding across studies is that banning shorts in a stressed market tends to raise trading costs and can worsen, not improve, price discovery, because it disables legitimate hedging alongside whatever bearish speculation it was meant to stop.
Don't equate "short selling" with "betting against the company." A large share of short-selling volume, especially in options-heavy names, is market makers and arbitrageurs hedging positions that have no directional view at all — banning it removes liquidity providers, not just bears.
Related concepts
Practice in interviews
Further reading
- Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, 'Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008 Shorting Ban' (Review of Financial Studies, 2013)
- SEC Emergency Order, Release No. 34-58592 (September 2008)