Unlevering and Relevering Beta
A listed company's beta measures the risk of its business and its borrowing mixed together. Stripping the debt out gives a clean business risk you can average across peers, then bolt back on at whatever capital structure you actually care about.
Prerequisites: The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Weighted Average Cost of Capital
You are valuing a private packaging business. It has no share price, so it has no beta, so CAPM has nothing to chew on. The obvious move is to borrow a beta from listed packaging companies. The obvious move is also wrong as stated, because the beta you can look up on a screen is not measuring what you want.
Think about what a levered equity actually is. Two firms own identical factories making identical boxes. One is debt-free; the other funded half its assets with a loan. When box demand drops 10%, both firms' assets lose the same value. But the levered firm's lenders are owed a fixed amount regardless, so the entire loss lands on a much smaller equity base. Same business, twice the swing in the share price. A regression of that share price against the index will report a higher beta — and none of the difference is about boxes.
So an observed levered (equity) beta is a mixture: the risk of the business, amplified by however much debt happens to sit on that particular company's balance sheet. Unlevering removes the amplifier. Relevering re-applies it at the leverage you have in mind.
The formula
The standard relationship is the Hamada equation:
is the levered beta you observe, the unlevered or asset beta — the beta the firm would have with no debt — the marginal tax rate, and the ratio of debt to equity at market values. In words: leverage multiplies business risk by a factor bigger than one, and the tax shield takes a little of the sting out because the government absorbs of every interest payment. Run it backwards to unlever:
Worked example: building a beta from comparables
Three listed packaging peers, with betas from a five-year monthly regression against a broad index, debt and equity at market value, and a 25% marginal tax rate.
| Comp | Levered β | Market D/E | Unlevered β |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 1.30 | 0.50 | 1.30 / (1 + 0.75 × 0.50) = 0.945 |
| B | 1.05 | 0.20 | 1.05 / (1 + 0.75 × 0.20) = 0.913 |
| C | 1.62 | 0.90 | 1.62 / (1 + 0.75 × 0.90) = 0.967 |
The raw betas span 1.05 to 1.62 — a 54% range that would swing a valuation wildly. Unlevered, they collapse to 0.913–0.967. That tightening is the whole point: it says these three really are the same business, and the spread was funding, not fundamentals.
Take the mean, , and relever to the target structure for the private firm, :
With a risk-free rate of 4.2% and an equity risk premium of 5.0%, the cost of equity is . Finish the job: means , and at a pre-tax cost of debt of 5.5%,
The you relever with and the weights you use in WACC must be the same capital structure. Relevering to a 35% target and then weighting WACC with today's actual 60% debt is internally inconsistent, and it is the mistake that shows up most often in modelling tests.
Refinements you will be asked about
Debt beta. Hamada assumes debt is riskless, . Fine for an investment-grade borrower; not fine for Comp C at 0.9× leverage. The general form is . Give Comp C a debt beta of 0.10 and its unlevered beta rises from 0.967 to 1.008 — you had been giving away risk that lenders were actually bearing.
Which leverage policy. The term embeds Myers' assumption of fixed debt. If instead the company rebalances to a constant debt ratio, the tax shield carries business risk and the Harris–Pringle version drops the tax term entirely: . Sponsors modelling an APV with a fixed amortisation schedule use the first; a corporate with a published target ratio fits the second.
Regression hygiene. Conventions differ and the answer moves with them: five years of monthly returns against a local index (Damodaran, Value Line) versus two years of weekly (Bloomberg's default). Monthly data reduces the non-synchronous-trading bias that drags illiquid small caps' betas down; weekly data reacts faster to a genuine change in the business. Raw betas are noisy enough that most providers apply a Blume adjustment toward 1.0 before you ever see them — check whether your screen is showing you raw or adjusted, because unlevering an already-shrunk beta double-counts the correction.
Use market values of debt and equity, never book. A distressed firm with book equity of 500 and market equity of 80 has a book of 1.2 and a market of 7.5; unlevering with the book figure hands you an asset beta that is far too high, which you then relever and use to justify a discount rate nobody would recognise.
Related concepts
Practice in interviews
Further reading
- Hamada, The Effect of the Firm's Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks (1972)
- Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, Valuation (Ch. 15)
- Damodaran, Investment Valuation (Ch. 8)