Quant Memo
Advanced

The House-Selling Problem and Reservation Values

A classic optimal-stopping problem — offers arrive one at a time and each viewing costs something, so how low an offer should you accept? — that produces a single threshold, the reservation value, below which you should always keep waiting.

Prerequisites: Optimal Stopping Theory

You're selling a house, or unwinding a large position by shopping it to buyers one at a time, or a trader is fielding one bid at a time for a block trade. Offers arrive sequentially, each drawn from some distribution you roughly know, and each round of waiting for the next offer costs you something — carrying cost, opportunity cost, the risk the market moves against you. Should you take the offer in front of you, or wait for a better one? Trying to plan the whole sequence of future offers seems hopeless since they're random. But the house-selling problem shows the optimal strategy collapses to one simple rule: pick a single number, and accept the first offer that clears it.

An analogy: fishing with a cost per cast

Imagine fishing where each cast costs a small fee, and each cast lands a fish of random size drawn from a distribution you know well from experience. You want to maximize (expected fish size kept) minus (total casting fees paid). It seems like you'd need to plan how many more casts to try based on everything you've caught so far — but the optimal rule turns out not to depend on history at all. There's one target fish size, and the rule is: keep casting until you land a fish at least that big, then stop. The target size doesn't change no matter how many small fish you've thrown back; each cast is a fresh independent draw, so past casts carry no information about future ones.

The idea, one symbol at a time

Let offers X1,X2,X_1, X_2, \ldots arrive independently, each drawn from a known distribution FF. Let cc be the cost incurred per round of waiting (search cost). The optimal strategy is a reservation value xx^*: reject every offer below xx^*, accept the first offer at or above xx^*. The reservation value is defined by the equation:

x=E[max(X,x)]c,x^* = \mathbb{E}[\max(X, x^*)] - c ,

or equivalently, using E[max(X,x)]=x+E[(Xx)+]\mathbb{E}[\max(X,x^*)] = x^* + \mathbb{E}[(X - x^*)^+] (where (Xx)+(X-x^*)^+ means "the amount by which XX exceeds xx^*, or zero if it doesn't"):

c=E[(Xx)+].c = \mathbb{E}[(X - x^*)^+] .

In plain English: xx^* is set so that the expected extra value gained by taking one more look — the average amount by which a fresh offer beats your current threshold, counting zero when it doesn't beat it — exactly equals the cost of taking that extra look. At the reservation value, you're indifferent between stopping now and taking one more draw; below it, one more draw is worth its cost; above it, it isn't. This is why the rule never depends on how many offers you've already seen and rejected: each new offer is a completely fresh, identical opportunity, so the calculus that determined xx^* never changes.

Worked example 1: uniform offers

Suppose offers are uniform on $[0, 100](inthousands)andthesearchcostis(in thousands) and the search cost isc = 5perround.Weneedper round. We needx^solvingsolving\mathbb{E}[(X - x^)^+] = 5.For. For X \sim \text{Uniform}[0,100],, \mathbb{E}[(X-x^)^+] = \frac{(100-x^)^2}{200}$. Setting this to 5:

(100x)2200=5    (100x)2=1000    100x31.6    x68.4.\frac{(100 - x^*)^2}{200} = 5 \;\Rightarrow\; (100-x^*)^2 = 1000 \;\Rightarrow\; 100 - x^* \approx 31.6 \;\Rightarrow\; x^* \approx 68.4 .

So the rule: reject any offer below $68,400; accept the first one at or above it. Even though the average offer is only $50,000, it's worth holding out for something notably above average because the cost of waiting is small relative to the upside from a lucky high offer.

Worked example 2: what happens as search gets more expensive

Keep the same uniform offers, but suppose carrying costs rise to c=20c = 20 per round (a much less patient seller). Solve (100x)2/200=20(100x)2=4000100x63.2x36.8(100-x^*)^2/200 = 20 \Rightarrow (100-x^*)^2 = 4000 \Rightarrow 100 - x^* \approx 63.2 \Rightarrow x^* \approx 36.8. The reservation value drops from $68,400 to $36,800 — a seller facing higher waiting costs should accept much lower offers, exactly matching the intuition that expensive patience isn't worth much.

offer size x* (reservation value) reject region accept region
Every offer below the reservation value x* is rejected; the first offer at or above x* is accepted — a single threshold, unchanged by how many offers have already been seen.
search cost c c=5 → x*≈68.4 c=20 → x*≈36.8
As the cost of waiting for another offer rises, the optimal reservation value falls — a less patient seller accepts a wider range of offers.

What this means in practice

The reservation-value structure recurs anywhere someone is sampling opportunities sequentially at a cost: shopping a block trade to counterparties one at a time, a portfolio manager screening deal flow, or a job seeker fielding offers. Its practical payoff is that the optimal policy is memoryless and requires no complex lookahead — you compute one number from the offer distribution and the search cost, and then apply a simple threshold rule to every offer as it arrives, with no need to track history.

When offers arrive one at a time from a known, unchanging distribution and each round of search costs a fixed amount, the optimal policy is a single reservation value x*: reject anything below it, accept the first offer at or above it. x* is set so the expected gain from one more look — E[(X−x*)⁺] — exactly equals the search cost, and the threshold never depends on how many offers have already been rejected.

The reservation-value rule assumes the offer distribution is stationary — every future offer is drawn from the same distribution as every past one, independent of what's already been seen. If offers actually trend (a market drying up, buyer interest fading over time, or a deal window closing), using a fixed reservation value computed from early-round assumptions will make you hold out for offers that are no longer realistically available — the memoryless property that makes the rule so simple is exactly what makes it fragile when the underlying process isn't actually stationary.

Related concepts

Practice in interviews

Further reading

  • Lippman & McCall (1976), The economics of job search
  • DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions, ch. 13
ShareTwitterLinkedIn