P&L Attribution For A Market Maker
A market maker's daily P&L is one number, but it comes from at least four different sources that behave nothing alike — spread capture, rebates, inventory mark-to-market, and adverse selection — and lumping them together hides which part of the business is actually working.
Prerequisites: The Economics Of Market Making, Markouts: Measuring Post-Trade Drift
A market maker closes the day up $4,000. That single number is nearly useless on its own — it could be $20,000 of clean spread capture wiped down to $4,000 by a bad afternoon of adverse selection on one name, or it could be $4,500 of spread and rebates minus $500 of inventory drift, a completely different, and much healthier, business. P&L attribution splits the one number into the pieces that actually drove it, because the fix for "too much adverse selection" (quote wider, or stop making markets in that name) is nothing like the fix for "too much inventory drift" (tighten position limits or hedge faster).
The four buckets
- Spread P&L: the difference between where you bought and where you sold, on matched round trips, holding the mid fixed. This is the "textbook" market-making profit.
- Rebate P&L: exchange payments for posting liquidity (or fees for taking it) — see Maker-Taker Fees. Often a meaningful fraction of total P&L on thin-spread, high-turnover names.
- Inventory P&L: mark-to-market gains or losses on whatever position you're carrying, purely from the price moving while you hold it — has nothing to do with how good your quotes were.
- Adverse selection P&L: the markout-based cost (see Markouts: Measuring Post-Trade Drift) of counterparties who were, on average, right about where the price was headed.
Worked example: one symbol, one day
A maker in a mid-cap stock does 8,000 round trips at an average captured spread of $0.015 and posts 16,000 shares' worth of maker volume earning a $0.0015/share rebate. Markouts at 10 seconds average −$0.008 per fill across 16,000 individual fills. Inventory ends the day 3,000 shares long, and the stock closed $0.20 higher than the maker's average holding price on the residual.
- Spread P&L: 8,000 × $0.015 = +$120
- Rebate P&L: 16,000 × $0.0015 = +$24
- Adverse selection P&L: 16,000 × (−$0.008) = −$128
- Inventory P&L: 3,000 × $0.20 = +$600
Total: 120 + 24 − 128 + 600 = +$616.
Look what happened: spread and rebates together made $144, adverse selection took back $128 of it, leaving barely $16 of genuine market-making edge — and the entire day's profit actually came from inventory, i.e., getting lucky on a directional position the desk happened to be carrying. Reported as a single $616 number, the day looks great. Attributed, it says the core market-making engine is nearly break-even and the desk got bailed out by an accidental long. Those call for very different Monday-morning conversations.
"We made money" and "market making worked today" are different claims. Attribution separates the edge you're actually skilled at generating from P&L that's really just an unhedged directional bet dressed up as market making.
A fast diagnostic: compute spread + rebate − adverse selection with inventory P&L set to zero, i.e., as if the desk had perfectly hedged every fill instantly. That number is the closest thing to "the market-making strategy's true skill," isolated from whatever the market happened to do to the residual position.
Inventory P&L is not automatically bad — a desk that deliberately runs some directional exposure on top of market making is doing something legitimate, as long as it's a conscious choice with its own risk limits, not an accident revealed only at attribution time. The danger is treating a lucky inventory windfall as evidence the quoting strategy is working, when the quoting strategy might be quietly losing money every single day.
Where this feeds back
- Model tuning. A persistently negative adverse selection bucket in one symbol is the trigger to widen quotes, skew more aggressively (see Skewing Quotes To Manage Inventory), or drop the symbol.
- Risk limits. A P&L dominated by the inventory bucket is a sign position limits are too loose relative to what the strategy is actually designed to do — see Inventory Management for Market Makers.
- Compensation and evaluation. Desks and individual traders are usually judged on the spread + rebate − adverse selection components, not raw P&L, precisely to avoid rewarding lucky directional bets.
In interviews
If asked to explain a market maker's P&L, resist naming just "spread." List all four buckets, and be ready with the punchline: total P&L can look great while the actual market-making edge is flat or negative, and attribution is the only way to tell the difference.
Related concepts
Practice in interviews
Further reading
- Cartea, Jaimungal & Penalva, Algorithmic and High-Frequency Trading (ch. 1-3)
- Harris, Trading and Exchanges (ch. 14)