The Discount for Lack of Marketability
A share you can sell in seconds on an exchange is worth more than an identical claim on the same cash flows that takes months to unload — that gap is the discount for lack of marketability.
Prerequisites: Control Premiums and Minority Discounts
Two investors each hold a claim worth an identical $1,000 in future cash flows. One holds it as shares of a company listed on a major exchange — sellable in seconds, at a visible price, to any of thousands of buyers. The other holds an identical economic claim in a private company — no exchange, few willing buyers, and a sale that could take months of negotiation. Nobody would value these two claims the same, even though the underlying cash flows are identical, because the ability to convert the claim into cash on demand is itself worth something.
The discount for lack of marketability (DLOM) reduces the value of an ownership interest to reflect that it cannot be quickly and cheaply converted into cash, unlike a share of a publicly traded, actively exchanged stock. It applies on top of — and separately from — any discount for lacking control.
Marketability is not the same thing as control
It's easy to conflate DLOM with the minority discount, but they measure different frictions and both can apply to the same interest. A minority discount reflects the inability to direct the company's decisions. A marketability discount reflects the inability to convert the holding into cash quickly at a fair price, regardless of whether the holder has control or not — even a 100% controlling owner of a private company faces a marketability problem, because there's no exchange to sell the whole company on tomorrow morning.
Empirical estimates of DLOM commonly draw on two kinds of evidence: restricted stock studies, comparing the price of a public company's freely tradable shares against otherwise-identical shares of the same company that are contractually restricted from trading for a period, and pre-IPO studies, comparing private transaction prices in the same company shortly before its IPO against the eventual IPO price. Both approaches tend to produce discounts in a wide range, commonly cited as roughly 15–35%, depending heavily on company size, the length of the restriction, and how uncertain the near-term liquidity event is.
Worked example
A private company's controlling-interest, public-equivalent value is estimated at $100 per share using precedent transactions. The interest being valued is a small minority stake, and the company has no near-term plans for an IPO or sale.
- Apply a minority discount of 20%: 100 \times (1 - 0.20) = \80$.
- Apply a DLOM of 25%, given the illiquid, no-near-term-exit profile: 80 \times (1 - 0.25) = \60$.
- Final estimated value per share for this minority, illiquid stake: $60 — a 40% total reduction from the control, public-equivalent starting point, even though the two discounts (20% and 25%) don't simply add.
What this means in practice
DLOM is applied constantly in estate and gift tax valuations, 409A valuations of private company common stock, and litigation over fair value of minority stakes — anywhere a private, illiquid interest needs a defensible dollar value. The size of the discount should be justified by facts specific to the interest: how likely and how near is a liquidity event (an IPO, a sale), are there contractual transfer restrictions, and how large and easily divisible is the stake.
Applying both a minority discount and a full public-company-scale DLOM to the same interest can double-count illiquidity if the "minority discount" benchmark already reflects some illiquidity itself (as some restricted-stock-based minority benchmarks do). Always check what liquidity assumption is already baked into the base value before layering a second discount on top.
Related concepts
Practice in interviews
Further reading
- Pratt, Valuing a Business (ch. 'Discount for Lack of Marketability')