The CCP Default Waterfall
When a clearing member defaults, a CCP absorbs the loss through a strict, ordered sequence of resources — the default waterfall — before any other member is forced to pay.
Prerequisites: Central Clearing and CCP Risk, Initial Margin vs Variation Margin
When a clearing member of a CCP defaults with open positions, someone has to absorb the cost of closing them out at a loss. A CCP doesn't just eat that loss, and it doesn't spread it randomly across every other member either — it works through a fixed, pre-published sequence of financial resources, in order, until the loss is covered. That sequence is the default waterfall.
The default waterfall is an ordered list of who pays first when a clearing member defaults: the defaulter's own resources are used up before anyone else's money is touched, and the CCP's own capital is used before other members' contributions are.
The layers, in order
- The defaulter's initial margin. The collateral that member posted specifically to cover its own positions is used first.
- The defaulter's contribution to the default fund. A mutualized pool every member pays into; the defaulter's own slice goes next.
- The CCP's own capital ("skin in the game"). A layer the CCP itself funds, so it shares in the pain of a bad default, not just the members.
- The mutualized default fund of surviving members. Only after the first three layers are exhausted do non-defaulting members' contributions get used.
- Further assessments or recovery tools. If losses exceed even that, the CCP can call for additional member contributions or apply loss-allocation tools as a last resort.
Worked example
A clearing member defaults with a position that costs $900 million to close out at prevailing prices. Its posted initial margin covers $500 million. Its slice of the default fund covers another $150 million. The CCP's own capital layer absorbs $50 million. That leaves $200 million, which is drawn from the mutualized default fund contributed by every other clearing member — a real cost to firms that had nothing to do with the defaulting position, but only reached after $700 million of dedicated resources were exhausted first.
What this means in practice
The ordering is what makes central clearing politically and financially workable: members are willing to mutualize losses because they know the defaulter's own money and the CCP's own capital go first, and because the waterfall's depth is calibrated (often to cover the default of the two largest members simultaneously, "Cover 2") to make survivors' losses a genuine tail event rather than a routine cost of membership.
"Skin in the game" is often a small layer relative to the mutualized default fund below it. A CCP whose own capital contribution is thin has weaker incentives to manage risk conservatively, since most of a large loss ultimately falls on other members, not on the CCP itself.
Related concepts
Practice in interviews
Further reading
- CPMI-IOSCO, 'Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures'