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Core

Capacity-Adjusted Return Curves

A single Sharpe number hides how a strategy's return changes as you size it up. A capacity-adjusted return curve reports performance as a function of book size instead of pretending there is only one.

Prerequisites: Capacity-Constrained Backtesting, Sharpe Ratio

A research memo says a strategy runs at "18% net return, Sharpe 2.0." That sentence is missing a word: at what size? An allocator who reads it as a fixed property of the strategy — like a Sharpe ratio is often treated — will size the mandate however the budget allows, discover the return degrades as the book grows, and conclude the desk oversold the strategy. The desk didn't lie. It just reported one point on a curve as if it were the whole curve.

The curve, not the point

Every dollar deployed pushes on the price a little, and that push scales roughly with the square root of how much of the day's volume you're consuming (see The Square-Root Impact Law). Gross edge per trade is roughly fixed in basis points; cost per trade grows with size. A capacity-adjusted return curve plots net return, or net Sharpe, against book size and shows exactly where the two lines cross — instead of reporting the return at one arbitrarily chosen size, usually the smallest one, because that's what the initial backtest happened to use.

Worked example

A statistical arbitrage book: gross edge of 25 bps per round trip at negligible size, 80 round trips a year, 10% annualised volatility. At zero size that's 20% gross return, Sharpe 2.0. Market impact model: 60 bps times the square root of participation rate pp, paid twice per round trip.

net bps per trade=252×60p.\text{net bps per trade} = 25 - 2 \times 60\sqrt{p}.
Book sizeParticipationImpact (both ways)Net per tradeNet annualNet Sharpe
$2m0.2%5.4 bps19.6 bps15.7%1.57
$20m2.0%17.0 bps8.0 bps6.4%0.64
$30m3.0%20.8 bps4.2 bps3.4%0.34
$42m4.2%24.6 bps0.4 bps~0%~0.04
$60m6.0%29.4 bps−4.4 bps−3.5%−0.35

The memo's "Sharpe 2.0" figure only exists near zero. By $42 million the edge is gone; a mandate sized above that pays the market to trade. Dollar profit, by contrast, is book size times net return per dollar, and that product peaks well before break-even — maximising W×(25120p)W \times (25 - 120\sqrt{p}) lands near $16 million, earning roughly 12.6% net, about $2.0 million a year at a Sharpe near 1.1. The size that makes the most money is neither the size in the pitch nor the size where the Sharpe finally hits zero.

max dollars (~\$16m) break-even (~\$42m) net Sharpe annual profit
The pitch-deck Sharpe is the value of the solid line at the far left. Neither the profit-maximising size nor the break-even size sits anywhere near it.

Report performance as a curve against book size, with at minimum the profit-maximising size and the break-even size marked — not a single Sharpe that implicitly means "at zero dollars."

The common confusion is treating the zero-size backtest Sharpe as portable to any allocation size, then being surprised when a larger mandate underperforms. It isn't underperforming; it's further along a curve that was always going to bend. A second, subtler version: two strategies compared on zero-size Sharpe can rank in the opposite order once compared at the size an allocator would actually fund, because impact sensitivity differs by strategy even when zero-size Sharpe looks similar.

When you see a single Sharpe number in a pitch, ask for the number at three sizes: current AUM, 2x, and 5x. A flat curve across those points means the strategy has real headroom; a steep one means the headline number is a snapshot of a book that hasn't been asked to hold real size yet.

Build the curve by re-running the backtest at each size with impact costs applied, not by scaling a single zero-size P&L series — position caps, partial fills, and liquidity screens all bind differently as size grows, and only a full re-simulation captures that. See Capacity-Constrained Backtesting for the mechanics.

Related concepts

Practice in interviews

Further reading

  • Frazzini, Israel & Moskowitz, Trading Costs of Asset Pricing Anomalies
  • Kyle & Obizhaeva, Market Microstructure Invariance
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